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ivansayer
20 Posts |
 Posted - 16/07/2006 : 20:21:24
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Hi All,
In the booklist in the Costello biography, the earliest
publication year is 1932, the year of 'Freedom in the
Modern World'. In the following year, MacMurray published
'Interpreting the Universe' and 'Philosophy of Communism'.
'Interpreting the Universe' is thus one of his earliest
published books, though it is evident to the serious reader
that the thoughts it contains have been considered for
quite some time.
The theme of the last chapter of that book, called
'Psychological Thought and Personality' is that the
neither of the thought-patterns, or 'unity-patterns'
discussed so far is adequate for the understanding of
human personality. The book is thus MacMurray's
account of 'what Philosophy is about' and where it is
at the time of writing.
The theme of that chapter is reintroduced with only
slight changes in the beginning of the first volume of
the Gifford Lectures which are properly taken by readers
to be as good an account of MacMurray's thought as we
have.
For these reasons, (that IU is early, and that it
contains material which surfaces again in the Giffords),
I intend to examine that book,'Interpreting the Universe',
and particularly its first chapter, in some detail.
'Interpreting the Universe'
Chapter I.
MacMurray begins by commenting that Philosophers begin
in confidence and end in disillusion with the familiar
Socratic conclusion that they know nothing. It is the
experienced Philosopher, not the confident novice, who
asks himself 'What is Philosophy and how does one set
about it ?'
This is as near as he comes to being autobiographical.
He turns from this disillusionment and the resulting
professional controversy with the following statement.
'But for all this the traditional commonsense of mankind
in all ages and amongst all races persists in giving to
philosophy a meaning which is definite and constant,
however difficult it is to express.'
He appears to be totally unconscious of the arguments
this statement might provoke, and goes on to state that
accordingly 'The philosopher should reveal himself not
as a specialist in a particular field but rather as one
who has grasped the significance of human life and
achieved the ability, if not to live well, at least to
understand how it should be lived.'
Philosophy, then, is about 'the meaning of life.'
Furthermore, 'every man has his own philosophy, whether
he can express it in the thin symbolism of abstract
language or not.' And, 'every period of human history
is the embodiment of a philosophical idea, since the
very activities and conventions which distinguish it
from other periods are themselves the expression of
one possible sigificance in which men may clothe their
lives.'
Philosophy is about 'the meaning of life' and further,
about the real meanings of actual lives, single and
plural. An understanding of Philosophy would also, in
some measure, be an understanding of actual lives and
real history. Indeed 'there is a philosophy embodied
in the contemporary world, if only we knew how to look
for it and how to express it. If we could find it,
it would interpret to us the meaning of our own history
and so help to solve the critical problems which
threaten to wreck our civilization.'
This is a bold, possibly brash, statement of the aims
and function of philosophy. I shall have, in the sequel,
to discuss how MacMurray backs away from it in many
ways. However, before we give in to the sniggers of
the positivists, let us reflect that the problem each
of us has, of locating our personal lives in a
tumultuous history certainly hasn't gone away, but lives
on and forms part of anything that can be called the
'meaning of life'. (Consider the green slogan 'Think
globally, act locally.') Those who confront insoluble
problems may look brash, but some (not all) of those who
pretend that philosophy is 'just another day at the
(conceptual) office', look rather comical and even
cowardly in retrospect.
He now takes up this boldly made connection between
philosophy, individual life and history and uses it as
a launching pad for the leading argument of the book.
'It is all very well to say that every man and every
society of men has its own philosophy. That is only
true in a most unhelpful sense. It might be truer to
say that their philosophy holds them in its grip and
tosses them helplessly from one surprise to another.
The trouble is that very few men and fewer societies
have any clear idea of what their philosophy is. It
remains unexpressed and half-conscious, implicit in
their ways of behaviour, in their hopes and fears, in
their ambitions and rivalry. The task of the
philosopher is to turn the searchlight of deliberate
thinking upon this heaving darkness. It is to
express in coherent and meaningful terms what is
usually only implicit in the way we live.'
The philosopher, then, is the man who interprets to
itself the 'helpless tossing' and the 'heaving
darkness' of real lives. Alas! this indeed sounds
brash when you think about it. And MacMurray does
not stay with it for long - but it is noteworthy that
it is from here that he launches his main framing
argument for the book.
Before discussing this framing argument, I want to
look briefly at it's endpoint in this chapter. By
contrast with the bold statements we have just read,
in the final pages of this chapter we have: -
'It is this wholeness and completeness of immediate
experience which we express when we speak of 'the
infinite'. The term is, of course, a negative term,
because it is the reflective expression of something
which cannot be given in reflection. The thing itself
is more positive than anything else we know. ...
Philosophy, then, is the attempt to express the
infinite in immediate experience through reflection.'
So that the final definition for the chapter has it
that the task of the philosopher is to express the
infinite - a special sort of smooth continuity which
belongs to immediate experience and is broken by
thought.
Between these two definitions there is a remarkable
but by no means perfect argument for a non-idealist
epistemology. But the inheritance from the idealism
in which he was brought up remains. Somewhere between
those two definitions the 'helpless tossing' and the
'heaving darkness' get lost, and 'the infinite' which
is immediate continuity takes their place. My initial
job is to attempt to describe how this happens and,
if possible, to say what it means.
Still thinking
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 31/07/2006 : 01:16:43
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Hi All,
I continue my examination of 'Interpreting the
Universe' from the opening paragraphs.
MacMurray finishes this opening section with two
paragraphs which enlarge the conclusion he has just
reached. The second contains this sentence.
'Philosophy, then, since it is one of the more
elaborate and systematic forms of our reflection
upon experience, involves a determined effort to
become conscious of something that is implicit in
the activities of human life and to express in
words through thinking that on which our reflection
is directed.'
This 'something that is implicit in the activities
of human life' is already something more general, more
neutral and less intimidating than the 'helpless
tossing' and the 'heaving darkness'.
To become conscious of 'something that is implicit',
we must think until we are capable of expressing it.
We think in order to express in language something
that is implicit in our experience. From this point,
his argument takes off.
*****************************************************
Before describing his argument here, I will make a point
that appears to me to be of considerable importance.
MacMurray almost always considers the attempt to express
as an attempt to express in an already existing and
learned language. He almost nowhere deals with the fact
that the sort of thinking he is talking about may precede
the development of an adequate language or of any language
at all. It seems to me that some of the limitations of
his thought arise from his ignoring of these possibly
special, but, in my personal opinion, crucial cases.
It is not only that there must have been a period in
hominid life before the invention of language - however,
we describe or define it. It is also true that there is
a period in every human life which is prelinguistic.
Language is not only inherited but also reinvented in
every generation.
It may be, as he usually claims, that human life cannot
be wholly described in organic terms. But it is none
the less true that our most characteristic capacities
are the product of evolution unless one is prepared to
believe in the special creation of a species with a
built-in capacity for generating non-communicating
languages. (We know that other species have languages.
But is there another species that generates so many
non-communicating languages ?)
As far as I know, he never explicitly discusses the
evolution/creation question. He takes it for granted
that Darwin has provided a solid foundation for
biology, but the role of evolution in the life of the
human race and, in particular, in its development of
speech and thought gets scant attention in his work.
There are solid limitations to his realism here.
(Not only his, just about every other philosopher of
whom I know.)
Indeed, his emphasis on the non-organic nature of
specifically human life can be seen as a sort of
creationism.
He now begins his discussion of what he calls 'immediate
experience'. This is experience which has been lived
through but not thought about, and not expressed in
words.
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 25/08/2006 : 00:22:07
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Let us recap the point from which this argument begins.
'It is all very well to say that every man and every
society of men has its own philosophy. That is only
true in a most unhelpful sense. It might be truer to
say that their philosophy holds them in its grip and
tosses them helplessly from one surprise to another.
The trouble is that very few men and fewer societies
have any clear idea of what their philosophy is. It
remains unexpressed and half-conscious, implicit in
their ways of behaviour, in their hopes and fears, in
their ambitions and rivalry. The task of the
philosopher is to turn the searchlight of deliberate
thinking upon this heaving darkness. It is to
express in coherent and meaningful terms what is
usually only implicit in the way we live.'
And again:
'The task of the philosopher is to turn the searchlight
of deliberate thinking upon this heaving darkness. It
is to express in coherent and meaningful terms what is
usually only implicit in the way we live.'
So, the job of the philosopher is to explicate the
mess that is ordinary immediate living, the 'helpless
tossing' and the 'heaving darkness', and to express
clearly what is usually only implicit. The remainder
of the chapter is spent discussing the process of
making the implicit explicit, the process of expression
through 'deliberate thinking'. The main result is
rather surprising.
In summary, the discussion proceeds as follows.
Our current definition of philosophy implies a distinction
between unexpressed experience and experience which has
been reflected on and expressed. Argument about the
definition of this distinction is unsatisfactory.
This is natural - to define that which is what it is
because it has not yet been thought about and defined is
not possible. 'We cannot describe immediate experience
because to describe it is to express and understand it.'
However, it is possible to intimate aspects of it by means
of example. MacMurray's example is his experience of being
taught a difficult skating manoeuvre, the reverse Dutch
Roll, by being taken through the motions by an expert.
He could not master the physical manoeuvres required from
a verbal description in a book. But his difficulties
vanished once an expert had swung him through the
movements and they became a part of his immediately
felt experience. We will have to return to this example.
It appears, then, that language and thought are not, of
necessity, paths to knowledge. Indeed, there are occasions
when they are a hindrance rather than a help.
On the basis of this one example, (he moves here quicker
than normal academic caution allows), he formulates the
principle that *all thought presupposes knowledge*.
I.e. basic knowledge emerges from an immediate experience
of the world which is prior to all thought. We think about
things not in order to know them but in order to know them
better.
He believes that this fact has been overlooked because
the recent systematic pursuit of knowledge by thought
called science has undue sway.
'...time after time, in discussions of science and its
discoveries, we find people talking as if the discoveries
of science wiped out our unscientific knowledge of the
world and put something quite different in its place.'
(He doesn't follow this up with cases, which he perhaps
should. Evolution e.g. All through these first chapters
he is coming to conclusions of great generality without
deigning to discuss cases.)
From this short defence of his basic principle, he now
concludes: 'Knowledge, then, is first and foremost that
immediate experience of things which is prior to all
expression and understanding.'
He alludes to, rather than discusses, examples
- people and places we know well - father and St Pauls.
He then concludes :-
'Reflection may raise our knowledge of the world
to a higher power. It can do no more than that. However
far it carries us, we must always presuppose and depend
upon the immediate unreflective knowledge which is the
foundation of everything else.'
As it seems to me, his basic principle here is not
immune to challenge. But we shall follow his argument
where he takes it before returning to test the steps.
However, we should notice that our immediate experience,
once described as a 'heaving darkness' to be illuminated
by rational philosophic thought has now become the source
of basic knowledge which reflection (= deliberate thinking)
can at best enhance.
MacMurray now gives us a long and somewhat rambling
paragraph contrasting immediate with primitive or raw
experience. I am not quite sure why he feels he needs
to do this, unless it is because the examples he has
himself chosen, familiar people and places, tend to be
among those that people living relatively stable lives
become acquainted with in early years. He points out
that since the capacity to speak is early developed
there is rarely experience without a reflective element.
He adds that it is possible to develop thought to the
point where it impairs our capacity for immediate
experience. He comes to the conclusion that the chief
characteristic of immediate experience is that we are
immersed in it, not thinking about it. Again, I
think that conclusion bears qualification, but I
continue.
MacMurray now makes another attempt to describe the undefinable
'immediate experience'. 'It is simply every experience and
all experience in so far as it is unreflective. It is
experience lived through, not thought about. We cannot,
therefore give an account of its immediacy. We can, however,
indicate the main contrast between immediate experience and
the expression of it through which it is interpreted in
reflection. In contrast with reflective experience its
essential character is its unity and completeness. Its parts
are not 'cut off with a hatchet'; they flow into one another
and belong together.'
Immediate experience is, then, a continuum.
'Now contrast this with reflectivity.... The unity and wholeness
of living experience is broken.'
By the end of this paragraph we are contrasting immediate
experience with its concrete wholeness with reflective activity
with its partial and abstract character.
Again, I observe that we have arrived at something that is, or
is nearly, the opposite valuation from which the argument started.
Originally, immediate experience was a 'helpless tossing' and a
'heaving darkness' which the philosopher was going to clarify by
'deliberate thinking'. Now,immediate experience has a wholeness,
unity, and meaningfulness which reflection, (the word which has
replaced 'deliberate thinking'), destroys with its partial and
abstract character. By the end of the again rambling paragraph
on this theme thought or reflective activity can even be
pathological.
The last step in the argument is to define specifically
philosophic reflection - as opposed to scientific reflection -
in terms of the current vocabulary.
Philosophy, as opposed to science, is about experience as a
whole. This does not mean the totality of it, but the universe
in 'that quality of completeness and wholeness that is given
in immediate experience, the absence of limits and clear-cut
boundaries, the *qualitative infinity* which characterizes it
in all its parts.
...'The characteristic of immediate experience is that it is
given in actual living as a whole, and this whole is broken by
reflection. The partiality of all reflection is discovered
everywhere within the field of reflection, and so raises the
problem of overcoming within itself the imperfection that
attends upon it.
The rest of the chapter enlarges on this conclusion. We
shall have to discuss it later.
It is now clear that we have arrived at a definition of
philosophy which is certainly different from and in some
ways almost opposite to the bold claim from which this
argument started. That claim, we should remember was
itself a challenge to the very modest claims that many
professionals make for their subject. Challenging that
modesty, MacMurray was going to show how philosophy could
enlighten the mess that is ordinary life (or immediate
experience) by focussing upon it the 'searchlight of
deliberate thinking'. Now he finds that immediate experience
is the source of all basic knowledge and that by contrast
reflection (or deliberate thinking) reveals everywhere its
limitations by isolating elements in the seamless continuity
of immediate experience.
MacMurray has clearly withdrawn towards a position that is
much closer to that professional modesty from which he
started. His aim as a philosopher is to overcome the
limitations of reflection within the activity of reflection,
to find a way of representing in reflection the infinity or
continuity which reflection naturally destroys.
There are two points I wish to make right here before I
proceed to more detailed examination.
(a) An argument which involves a volte-face like this must
have some weaknesses. We will have to track some of them.
(b) The fact that this is so does not necessarily
invalidate his original ambitions for Philosophy. It merely
means that if we wish to support them we have some work to do
which he didn't manage here. This is a fact which philosophic
critics often forget. The fact that you can smash one
argument for a conclusion does not necessarily mean that you
have shown the conclusion false.
The problem with fundamental questions is that they last
longer than their would-be answerers.
You cannot give what you do not have |
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 20/09/2006 : 21:19:30
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HI ALL,
I HAVE NOW TO CRITICISE THE ARGUMENT I SUMMARISED IN MY
LAST POST.
MACMURRAY BEGAN BY REJECTING THE ACRIMONIOUS PROFESSIONAL
CONTROVERSIES ABOUT THE NATURE OF PHILOSOPHY AND PICTURED
THE PHILOSOPHER APPLYING THE SEARCHLIGHT OF 'DELIBERATE
THOUGHT' TO THE 'HEAVING DARKNESS' OF ORDINARY LIFE. BUT
HE ENDED BY TRYING TO OVERCOME THE INABILITY OF
REFLECTION (=DELIBERATE THOUGHT) TO REPRODUCE THE INFINITY
OR CONTINUITY OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE. (PRESUMABLY
'IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE' IS PART OF ORDINARY LIFE.)
THESE TWO GOALS ARE QUITE DIFFERENT THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY
OPPOSED. IF WE REMAIN SERIOUS ABOUT THE FIRST THEN THE
OBVIOUS METHOD IS TO DESCRIBE CERTAIN PORTIONS OF THE
'HEAVING DARKNESS' AND USE THE DESCRIPTION AS A BASIS
FOR BOTH AN EXPLANATION AND AN EXPOSITION OF WHAT
(IN OUR VIEW) CONSTITUTES AN EXPLANATION.
SINCE, IN MACMURRAY'S VIEW, ALL IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IS
A CONTINUUM, IT IS QUITE DIFFICULT TO SEE HOW AN
EXPLANATION OF CONTINUITY COULD LEAD TO EXPLANATIONS
OF ANY ONE PARTICULAR SERIES OF EVENTS. THERE ARE
MATHEMATICAL AND PHYSICAL THEORIES OF CONTINUA.
- AND ONE MAY ASK WHETHER THERE ARE ANY SPECIFIC
CONTRIBUTIONS THAT PHILOSOPHY HAS TO MAKE TO THE THEORY
OF CONTINUA? MACMURRAY WOULD BE ONE OF THE FEW FOR
WHOM THE ANSWER TO THAT QUESTION WOULD MOST CERTAINLY
BE YES.
AFTER A DISCUSSION OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE - INCLUDING
THE EXAMPLE OF HIS EXPERIENCE OF BEING TAUGHT A SKATING
MANOEUVRE - HE CONCLUDES THAT 'ALL THOUGHT PRESUPPOSES
KNOWLEDGE'. THIS CONCLUSION CAN BE CHALLENGED. MYSELF,
I WOULD REWRITE IT THUS. "ALL THOUGHT PRESUPPOSES
CONTACT" "A NUMBER OF CONTACTS, POSSIBLY MORE THAN ONE,
GIVES RISE TO ASSUMED KNOWLEDGE" "ALL THOUGHT
PRESUPPOSES ASSUMED KNOWLEDGE". WE MAY, AS THE PROCESS
OF THOUGHT CONTINUES, COME TO BELIEVE THAT OUR
ASSUMPTIONS ARE FALSE.
ALTHOUGH HE DOES MENTION ILLUSION LATER, IN HIS
ARGUMENT HERE, HE DOES NOT MENTION IT AT ALL, AND SO
MANAGES TO SUGGEST, WITHOUT ACTUALLY STATING IT THAT
THERE IS A LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE ARISING FROM IMMEDIATE
EXPERIENCE WHICH IS PERMANENTLY IMMUNE TO CHALLENGE.
TO SWALLOW THIS SUGGESTION WOULD BE GOING TOO FAR. NO
THOUGHT PROCESS STARTS WITHOUT ASSUMED KNOWLEDGE, BUT
NOTHING PROTECTS US A PRIORI FROM THE DISCOVERY THAT OUR
ASSUMPTIONS ARE FALSE. HE SPEAKS OF 'IMMEDIATE KNOWLEDGE'
AS THOUGH IT AROSE IN AN UNPROBLEMATIC FASHION FROM
'IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE'. THIS LOOKS PLAUSIBLE GIVEN HIS
EXAMPLES (SKATING TECHNIQUE, FAMILIAR PERSONS AND PLACES).
HOWEVER
1) SUPPOSE HE HAD PROVED UNABLE TO REPRODUCE THE
REQUIRED MOVEMENTS WITHOUT THE EXPERT'S CONTROLLING HANDS.
THERE IS NO CONTRADICTION INVOLVED IN THIS SUPPOSAL.
THE EXPERIENCE WOULD HAVE BEEN NO LESS IMMEDIATE. I.E.
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY GIVE RISE TO
DESIRED KNOWLEDGE;
2) DREAMS ARE PART OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE.
IMMDEDIATE EXPERIENCE DOES NOT GIVE RISE TO KNOWLEDGE ONLY.
HOWEVER, THE FACT THAT HE HERE OVERESTIMATES THE PRODUCT
OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IN NO WAY INVALIDATES A PRINCIPAL
PART OF HIS CASE. IT REMAINS SIMPLY AND ABSOLUTELY TRUE,
ACCORDING TO ME, THAT IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE OF SOME KIND
IS AN ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL INGREDIENT IN KNOWLEDGE. SERIOUS
ATTEMPTS TO EMULATE DESCARTES SEEM TO LEAD ONLY TO THE
CONCLUSION THAT NOTHING MUCH OF INTEREST FOLLOWS FROM THE
PROPOSITION 'I DOUBTED EVERYTHING JUST NOW.' ONE MAY COME
TO DOUBT ANY PARTICULAR AND EXPRESSIBLE ASSUMPTION, BUT
DOUBTING THEM ALL A PRIORI APPEARS TO LEAD NOWHERE. WE
SHOULD THEN REMEMBER THAT IN SPITE OF THE CONVICTION WITH
WHICH MACMURRAY ANNOUNCES HIS RULE THERE IS NO
CONTRADICTION IN ASSUMING THAT THE MAJOR PRESUPPOSITIONS
OF ANY PARTICULAR THOUGHT PROCESS MAY TURN OUT TO HAVE
BEEN FALSE.
MACMURRAY BELIEVES THAT HIS (RATHER SHAKY) RULE HAS
BEEN OVERLOOKED BECAUSE THE RECENT SYSTEMATIC PURSUIT OF
KNOWLEGE BY THOUGHT CALLED SCIENCE HAS UNDUE SWAY.
'...TIME AFTER TIME, IN DISCUSSIONS OF SCIENCE AND ITS
DISCOVERIES, WE FIND PEOPLE TALKING AS IF THE DISCOVERIES
OF SCIENCE WIPED OUT OUR UNSCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE
WORLD AND PUT SOMETHING QUITE DIFFERENT IN ITS PLACE.'
HE IS CONTINUING TO LEAN, HERE ON HIS SUGGESTION THAT
THERE IS A LEVEL OF KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS IMMUNE TO CRITICISM
BY THOUGHT. HE REALLY SHOULD DISCUSS CASES. MOST OF
US STILL SEE THE EARTH GO ROUND THE SUN. VERY
FEW OCCIDENTALS BELIEVE THAT IT DOES SO. OR AGAIN, MOST OF
US DAILY ASSUME THE NOTION OF ABSOLUTE SIMULTANEITY. BUT
MOST PHYSICISTS BELIEVE THIS ASSUMPTION TO BE FALSE.
IT MAY NONE THE LESS BE TRUE THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF
PHILOSOPHY IN THE DIRECTION OF IDEALISM AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF SYSTEMATIC SCIENCE ARE INDEED RELATED.
HIS EXAMPLES OF THINGS KNOWN BY 'IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE' ARE
PERSONS AND PLACES WE KNOW WELL. FROM A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF
THEM HE CONCLUDES THAT 'REFLECTION MAY RAISE OUR KNOWLEDGE
OF THE WORLD TO A HIGHER POWER. IT CAN DO NO MORE THAN
THAT. HOWEVER FAR IT CARRIES US, WE MUST ALWAYS PRESUPPOSE
AND DEPEND ON THE IMMEDIATE UNREFLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE WHICH IS
THE FOUNDATION OF EVERYTHING ELSE.'.
WE NOTICE, AGAIN, THAT THESE EXAMPLES SUGGEST NOTHING
OF THE 'HEAVING DARKNESS' WITH WHICH HE EARLIER CLAIMED TO
BE CONCERNED. AND THAT HE HAS INVERTED THE ORDER OF
IMPORTANCE OF EXPERIENCE AND REFLECTION.
FROM THIS SHORT AND TO MY MIND INADEQUATE DEFENCE OF HIS
RULE HE NOW CONCLUDES: 'KNOWLEDGE, THEN, IS FIRST AND
FOREMOST THAT IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE OF THINGS WHICH IS
PRIOR TO ALL EXPRESSION AND UNDERSTANDING.'
HE HERE EQUATES KNOWLEDGE WITH IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE WITHOUT
FOR A MOMENT RECALLING THAT DREAMS, FANTASIES AND OUTRIGHT
ILLUSIONS ARE EQUALLY PART OF IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE. ALL WHO
ARE NOT BLIND SEE MOTOR CARS GET SMALLER AS THEY TRAVEL AWAY
- BUT WE KNOW THIS DOES NOT HAPPEN.
FOR MYSELF, I WOULD CALL THE NEAREST PRODUCT OF IMMEDIATE
EXPERIENCE 'PREJUDICE'. THE WORD CARRIES A NEGATIVE
CONNOTATION - BUT IT NEED NOT. A PREJUDICE MAY TURN OUT TO
BE VERY RELIABLE. IF SO, WE EVENTUALLY CALL IT KNOWLEDGE.
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE GENERATES EXPECTATIONS. SOMETIMES
THESE ARE FULFILLED AND RETAINED, SOMETIMES THEY ARE
NOT FULFILLED AND DISCARDED. SOMETIMES WE RETAIN THEM IN
SPITE OF LACK OF FULFILMENT. THIS CAN GENERATE
CONTROVERSY.
MACMURRAY'S MEANDERING DISCUSSION IS CONFUSING. HE FAILS,
IN MY OPINION, TO SINGLE OUT THE REAL CHARACTERISTICS OF
'IMMEDIACY' - THAT IT IS PRESENT, (NOT PAST), AND MINE,
NOT NAPOLEON BONAPARTE'S.
WHETHER 'IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE' IS EVER 'OURS' IS A QUESTION
THAT A PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHER SHOULD RAISE - BUT THIS IS
AN EARLY WORK, AND EVEN IN 'SELF AS AGENT' HE EXPLICITLY
RETAINS THE EGOCENTRIC LIMITATION. HE PROMISES TO CORRECT
THIS IN 'PERSONS IN RELATION', BUT ONE ONE CAN REASONABLY ASK
WHETHER HE EVER REALLY TRIES TO. HE DOESN'T REALLY AIM IN
THIS DIRECTION HERE, BECAUSE HE IS TRYING TO ARRIVE AT THE
CONCLUSION THAT IMMEDIACY IS DEFINED BY ABSORPTION OR
ABSENCE OF REFLECTION, AND BY CONTINUITY. WE SHOULD NONE
THE LESS CARRY THIS QUESTION WITH US. IS IMMEDIATE
EXPERIENCE EVER 'OURS' RATHER THAN ONLY 'MINE'? ON THE
ONE HAND NO ARGUMENT GENERALLY ACCEPTED AS CONVINCING FOR
A 'YES' ANSWER HAS EVER BEEN ADVANCED. ON THE OTHER HAND
IT IS DIFFICULT TO ACCOUNT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF LANGUAGE
IF WE DO NOT TAKE THAT ANSWER COMPLETELY FOR GRANTED.
THERE CAN BE NO ARGUMENT FOR THE PROPOSITION THAT LANGUAGE
DOESN'T EXIST.
IN REALITY, THE FACT THAT AN EXPERIENCE IS LIVED THROUGH
RATHER THAN THOUGHT ABOUT IN NO WAY GUARANTEES THAT IT IS
WHOLLY IMMEDIATE. WHEN MACMURRAY LEARNT THE REVERSE DUTCH
ROLL, THE SKILL WAS, PRESUMABLY RETAINED RELATIVELY
PERMANENTLY. THE LESSON GAVE HIM A CERTAIN IMMEDIATE
EXPERIENCE - BUT THE POINT REMAINED AFTER THE EXPERIENCE
HAD PASSED. AGAIN, I MAY BE WHOLLY ABSORBED IN MY ATTEMPTS
TO REPAIR MY CAR ENGINE TO THE POINT WHERE I RESENT
INTRUSION - BUT THE REASON FOR MY ABSORPTION MAY BE THAT
IF DON'T GET IT REPAIRED I WON'T MAKE IT TO THE GRAND FINAL
TOMORROW. ABSORPTION IN AN EXPERIENCE DOES NOT GUARANTEE
THAT EVERY ELEMENT OF AN EXPERIENCE IS IMMEDIATE.
(THE ENGINE DESIGN MAY HAVE BEEN IN USE FOR DECADES).
MOREOVER, ABSORPTION DOES NOT GUARANTEE THAT AN EXPERIENCE IS
NON-REFLECTIVE. I CAN BE WHOLLY ABSORBED IN TRYING TO SOLVE
AN EQUATION.
SO, AFTER HAVING SAID THAT IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE IS UNDEFINABLE,
MACMURRAY SUGGESTS THAT IT IS A SOURCE OF UNCHALLENGEABLE
KNOWLEDGE AND DESCRIBES IT BY CONTRASTING IT WITH REFLECTION,
THE ABSORBED WITH THE DETACHED.THE CONTINUOUS AND CONCRETE
WITH THE PARTIAL AND ABSTRACT, THE BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY,
THEN, IS TO DESCRIBE MORE FULLY THAT CONTINUITY.
IN FACT, THIS CONTRAST IS AT LEAST PARTLY SPURIOUS. I HAVE
ALREADY POINTED OUT THAT ABSORPTION IN AN EXPERIENCE DOES NOT
MAKE EVERY ELEMENT OF THAT EXPERIENCE IMMEDIATE. ONE MAY BE
WHOLLY ABSORBED IN LISTENING TO A SERMON ABOUT EVENTS THAT
TOOK PLACE TWO THOUSAND YEARS AGO. NOR IS IT TRUE, AS
MACMURRAY ASSERTS, THAT IN IMMEDIATE SPONTANEOUS ACTIVITY ALL
OF THE SELF AND ITS CAPACITIES ARE INVOLVED. IT IS NOT
IMPOSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A GOOD COMPOSER WHO WINS WIMBLEDON
FINALS. DO HIS/HER MUSICAL SKILLS CONTRIBUTE TO THOSE LETHAL
VOLLEYS ?
WHETHER ONE CAN DEFINE 'IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE' DEPENDS HOW
FORMAL ONE IS BEING. I WOULD DESCRIBE 'IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE'
AS HAPPENING TO ME AND NOW. IF IT HAPPENS TO SOMEBODY ELSE IT
IS NOT USUALLY REGARDED AS IMMEDIATE. IF IT HAPPENED THIRTY
DAYS AGO IT IS NOT USUALLY REGARDED AS IMMEDIATE. WHETHER THIS
IS A DEFINITION DEPENDS ON WHAT LIST OF TERMS ONE ACCEPTS AS
UNDEFINABLE. ON THIS VIEW, IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE CANNOT, OF
ITSELF, BE KNOWLEDGE. TO KNOW A MAN AS FATHER IS TO *RECOGNIZE*.
KNOWLEDGE IMPLIES A MIXTURE OF PAST AND PRESENT, MEDIATE AND
IMMEDIATE.
THIS DESCRIPTION/DEFINITION RAISES PROBLEMS. THOSE
PROBLEMS INCLUDE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER IT IS POSSIBLE TO
HAVE AN IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCE OF THE FACT THAT THERE ARE
IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCES WHICH ARE 'OURS' RATHER THAN 'MINE',
OR THAT THERE ARE EXPERIENCES THAT ARE IMMEDIATE BUT NOT
IMMEDIATE FOR ME. NO GENERALLY ACCEPTED ARGUMENT HAS EVER
BEEN ADVANCED FOR THESE POSSIBILITIES OTHER THAN THE OBVIOUS
ONE THAT ARGUMENT ITSELF SEEMS POINTLESS IF ONE DOES NOT TAKE
THEM COMPLETELY FOR GRANTED. WE DO NOT CONSTRUCT ARGUMENTS AND
THEN ASK OURSELVES WHETHER THERE ARE OR EVER HAVE BEEN
CREATURES WHO MIGHT APPRECIATE THEM. AN ARGUMENT, AFTER ALL,
EMPLOYS A LANGUAGE, A LANGUAGE WHICH WAS, FOR THE MOST PART,
INVENTED BY OTHER PEOPLE. WE LEARN TO SPEAK AND TO ARGUE
MUCH AS MACMURRAY LEARNED TO SKATE.
NON-ACADEMIC ARGUMENT IS QUITE FREQUENTLY A RESPONSE TO THE
DISCOVERY THAT SOMEBODY ELSE'S IMMEDIATE EXPERIENCES CAUSE
THEIR PREJUDICES TO DIFFER FROM ONE'S OWN. INDEED MUCH
CONFLICT IS GENERATED BY DIFFERENCES IN PREJUDICES BETWEEN
INDIVIDUALS AND GROUPS. IF THE GROUPS ARE LARGE ENOUGH,
WARS RESULT - AND WITH THEM, MUCH 'HELPLESS TOSSING' AND
'HEAVING DARKNESS'.
I NOTE THAT THE ONE QUESTION MACMURRAY DOES NOT ADDRESS
ANYWHERE IN THIS CHAPTER IS THE QUESTION OF WHOSE IMMEDIATE
EXPERIENCE WE ARE DISCUSSING. HE DOES, AT ONE POINT, SAY
THAT IT IS DIFFERENT FOR DIFFERENT PEOPLE AND DEPENDENT ON
SOCIAL HABIT. (PAGE 21 SECOND FABER EDITION.) IN EFFECT,
HE CONCEDES MY POINT THAT NO MATTER HOW ABSORBED I MAY BE
IN AN EXPERIENCE, I BRING TO IT A LOT OF INHERITED BAGGAGE.
BUT HE DOESN'T ALLOW THIS CONCESSION TO DRIVE HIM TO
RESTATE HIS ARGUMENT.
THUS WE HAVE TWO DIFFERENT, THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY OPPOSED,
CONCEPTIONS OF PHILOSOPHY CONNECTED BY A MEANDERING ARGUMENT
OF DUBIOUS VALIDITY. AS I HAVE ALREADY POINTED OUT, THE
FACT THAT THIS ARGUMENT IS VERY FLAWED INVALIDATES NEITHER
CONCEPTION OF PHILOSOPHY. THERE CAN BE BAD ARGUMENTS FOR
TRUE CONCLUSIONS.
MY REMARKS OF THE THIRD LAST PARAGRAPH SUGGESTED, AND WERE
MEANT TO SUGGEST THE SPECULATION THAT THERE IS AN INTRUSION
OF PERSONAL BIOGRAPHY INTO THE ARGUMENT HERE. ONE OF THE
CONTENTIONS OF THE LIVELY AND WELL-RESEARCHED BIOGRAPHY OF
MACMURRAY BY JOHN COSTELLO IS THAT MACMURRAY'S BASIC
ATTITUDES WERE FIRMLY FORMED IN THE WORLD IN WHICH HE
GREW UP BEFORE THE GREAT WAR. IF I AM RIGHT, PART OF THE
MOTIVATION OF HIS THOUGHT WAS TO COME TO TERMS WITH THE
SHARP CONTRAST OF HIS EARLY LIFE AND THE 'HEAVING DARKNESS'
OF THE WORLD OF WAR AND DEPRESSION IN WHICH HE HAD TO FIND
A FOOTHOLD AS AN ADULT. IN SO FAR AS THIS WAS AN AIM OF
HIS THOUGHT, I BELIEVE HIS SUCCESS WAS ONLY VERY PARTIAL.
THERE IS AN UNDERCURRENT OF SUFFERING AND CONFUSION IN HIS
WAR EXPERIENCE AND PERSONAL LIFE WHICH HIS CONFIDENTLY
ASSUMED PROFESSIONAL PERSONA COVERED RATHER WELL, TOO
WELL FOR THIS AIM TO BE COMPLETELY ACHIEVED.
HOWEVER, EVEN IF WE ACCEPT THIS CAPSULE EXPLANATION IT
NEEDS TO BE CHECKED AGAINST THE AVAILABLE SOURCES AND
AMPLIFIED. AND, EVEN IF IT WITHSTANDS THAT CHECK THAT
IS NOT THE END OF THE MATTER.
SO, THE FINAL CONCLUSION OF THIS CHAPTER IS THAT THE
BUSINESS OF PHILOSOPHY IS TO REPRODUCE IN REFLECTION
THAT SEAMLESS CONTINUITY WHICH IS, BY NATURE, ABSENT
FROM IT. IT IS NOT OBVIOUS WHAT THIS MEANS, HOW IT
IS TO BE DONE, OR WHAT BENEFITS RESULT. BUT THIS IS,
AFTER ALL, ONLY CHAPTER ONE. ANYBODY CARE TO ROAST
CHAPTER TWO ?
IVAN
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Interpreting the Universe
