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ivan sayer
2 Posts |
 Posted - 12/05/2005 : 23:10:03
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See next post. Teething problems with forum!
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 29/06/2005 : 19:16:18
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John MacMurray's new logic.
MacMurray maintains that in order to represent the unity
of the self we need to conceive
'a positive, which necessarily contains its
own negative'.
(Self as Agent Ch. 4 p.98 Faber hardback edition)
He nowhere discusses directly the way in which this
construct differs from an Hegelian synthesis of opposites.
I)In fact, he dodges this question, thus:-
'The organic form might seem to be in a better
position: and indeed it has the advantage that it can
represent the spontaneity of the self, and to this
extent is more adequate. Moreover it can represent a
unity of positive and negative elements, which stand
in a necessary dialectical relation as thesis and
antithesis in the unity of a process of development.
If then we conceive the Self not as substance but
as organism, and represent it through the organic
unity-pattern, it might appear that its positive and
negative modes, as agent and as subject, could be
represented as thesis and antithesis in a dialectical
process of self-development. But this is an illusion.
For thesis and antithesis represent successive phases
in the development of a unitary system. If we represent
action and thought as thesis and antithesis in a self-
development, we must represent them as successive phases
in the development of the self. But then it must be
impossible to represent the same Self as at one and the
same time both Agent and Subject. For when it is Agent
it will not be Subject; and if this were actually the
case, then the Self could never know that it was Agent,
nor could it ever act with knowledge. The positive and
negative phases would still exclude one another, and no
synthesis would be possible. This we may recall, is
precisely Kierkegaard's criticism of the Hegelian
philosophy. The dialectic of the personal life, he
maintains, is a dialectic without a synthesis.'
(Self as Agent pp. 96-97)
Fine - suppose we write the positive as behaviour, the
negative as thought, and the synthesis of the two as
agency. In fact, this is close to, though different
from, the way MacMurray argues in the previous chapter,
(pp 68-69).
'There is much to be said for the view that
Kant's thinking, or at least his method of exposition is
dialectical: and this would be in full accordance with
his acceptance of the romantic doctrine that thinking,
in concreto, is a process of imaginative synthesis.
[...]
If we take this view of Kant's method of construction in
the Critical Philosophy as a whole, we may resolve the
formal contradiction between premiss and conclusion.
Through every stage of the progressing argument Kant
proceeds as if reason were primarily theoretical; as
if the 'Cogito' and the standpoint it establishes, were
adequate. The conclusion, that reason is primarily
practical, takes us beyond this premiss, and involves
its qualification from a more comprehensive standpoint.
But there is this difference from all earlier stages,
that the discovery of the primacy of practical reason
is a final conclusion, and not the starting point of
a new stage. Kant goes no further. Instead he erects
a barrier against every attempt to go further.
[...]
Nevertheless, the Critical Philosophy points the way,
even if it forbids the attempt, to a formal
reconstruction which would start from the primacy of
the practical, and take up into itself the theoretical
as an element within the practical.'
So, in what way is the new logical form different
from a synthesis of opposites and in what way is
it related to a synthesis of opposites ?
(And, is this question merely a loose thread, or
is its absence a major ommission ?)
Why does this question matter ?
According to me, it matters for the following reason.
A major thrust of MacMurray's Gifford lectures is
the destruction of idealist metaphysics. For those
who are convinced, idealism is refuted. But what
happens in the process to idealist or dialectical
logic ? Does it get junked? No way. As I have
shown above, (instances could be multiplied),
MacMurray continues to use it as a device of
exegesis. Moreover, he does so in other works,
including the final paragraphs of 'Clue to
History'. Thus(4th ed SCM Press p.237):-
'This achievement of the destruction of
civilization of Fascism is itself unreal.
[...] It can only destroy itself and create its
opposite. It depends on the Jewish consciousness
which it opposes, and it develops in the world,
through its own negativity, the negative form of
the Jewish consciousness, in its rejection of its
own Christian substance. But by securing the
triumph of this Jewish consciousness it
universalizes it; and in its development it must
negate the negation and achieve in the world as a
whole the triumph of the positive reality of the
Jewish consciousness which is Christianity.
It is the inevitable destiny of fascism to create
what it intends to prevent - the socialist
commonwealth of the world.'
This would indeed be easy to mock - but
mockery is *not* my purpose. Here we have
MacMurray in full flight using idealist logic to
arrive at conclusions about historical development,
conclusions which we now know were wide of the mark.
That was written in the thirties. By the time he
comes to write the Gifford Lectures his political
position has shifted. But it has shifted as a
response to the empirical fact that the Soviet
Union turned out to be anything but a socialist
commonwealth as Western lefties understood it.
Revaluation of his own reasoning, and the tools
he used to construct it, is left to the reader.
So, MacMurray still uses dialectical or idealist
logic without making any obvious attempt to
rescue it from the discarded metaphysics with
which it was originally associated. It is not
enough to say that it is merely a 'device of
exegesis' when it clearly contributes so much
to the construction of conclusions, including
manifestly false conclusions. (Kant *did* say
that the dialectic of reason was a dialectic
of illusion!)
What, then, is 'dialectical logic', and what relation
does it bear to MacMurray's new logical form ?
I have, as yet, no answer to either of these questions.
What is 'dialectic' ? The only thing everybody, (well
most European intellectuals), seems to agree about is
that 'dialectic' means 'logical discussion'. But, even
then, 'logical' should be taken to mean 'semantically
organised and sequential', rather than 'inferentially
water-tight'.
If you follow the question beyond this rather grey
agreement you are in for some frustrating encounters with
some very verbose gurus. (Hegel, McTaggart &c.) So far,
I have always come away from such encounters wondering why
I was wasting my time. I tend to remember only that
Socrates said, (I forget which dialog), that he used
dialectic to expose ignorance; some of Hegel's exegetes
give it out that he, Hegel, used dialectic to scale
the cliffs of something called 'Absolute Knowledge'.
I believe Socrates had it right. And, if I'm right
about that, there's a very great deal of philosophy
from the last two hundred years that has to be
understood sociologically rather than treated as
genuine information, not excluding the last quoted
paragraph from 'Clue to History'.
Since it is MacMurray we are talking about, let us
review briefly what *he* has to say about dialectic.
He has quite a lot to say - most of it dogmatic and
controversial - in 'Interpreting the Universe'. But
for brevity, I will avoid the controversy and look at
page 93 of 'Self as Agent'.
'Consider first, from the standpoint of the
'I do', the procedure of mathematics. If I have a
practical problem which admits of an algebraic solution,
I have a double task before me. I must first formulate
the relevant aspects of the concrete situation in a
set of algebraic equations. When I have done this, I
must go on to solve the equations by a procedure which
is dictated by the rules for the manipulation of algebraic
symbols. These two tasks, though interrelated, are
distinct. The first demands a concrete grasp of an
actual situation, and consists in constructing a symbolic
representation of the situation, or of that part of it
which is relevant to the problem. The second is a
series of transformations of the symbolic representation
in accordance with general rules, and requires no
understanding of the situation which is represented. It
can indeed be done for me by somebody else, or by a
machine constructed for the purpose.
Now any actual process of thinking involves
these two processes, or at least their analogues.'
On this view, symbolic logic is the logic of
inference and can be performed by a machine, while
dialectical logic is the logic of formulation. It
seems simple enough - until you start to consider
instances. If you drop the word logic and simply
consider the process of formulation as an historical
process, it is clear that when an individual or
group has a problem, the process of formulation could
be anything from the assignment of variables, (let
x be the number of sheep we want to run...), to the
invention of an adequate language. There is no
rule that guarantees that when an individual or
group faces a problem that they will be possessed of
a language adequate to its discussion. (To stick
with the mathematical example, try and write an
algebra textbook, adequate by today's European
standards using only roman numerals.)
Clearly, if the reigning language is inadequate to
the problem then some attempts at formulation will
likely be precisely a dialectic of illusion.
Thus the attempt to discuss my two questions, to which
I have, as I said, no answer, leads straight to the
further question as to whether any language we now have
is adequate to this problematic. Needless to say, I
can't answer that one either. I do notice, however
that, in the published writings I have, MacMurray
mentions this problem only once, and then from the point
of view of the individual thinker struggling with his
inherited language, not from the point of view of one
or more communities struggling to communicate. Did
he ever think, I wonder, about the Tower of Babel ?
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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Paul_Gee
9 Posts |
Posted - 30/06/2005 : 14:52:21
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NB if your font size is set too big this will not fit on the screen
Thank you, Ivan, for a thought provoking post.
I have picked out a few of your points and give
a some reflections below. Macmurray’s new logic
is perhaps the least discussed aspect of
Macmurray’s work.
So it is good to give it an airing!
1 Macmurray dodges the question
Ivan writes ‘MacMurray maintains that in order to represent the unity
of the self we need to conceive 'a positive, which necessarily contains its own negative'. (Self as Agent Ch. 4 p.98 Faber hardback edition) He nowhere discusses directly the way in which this construct differs from an Hegelian synthesis of opposites. In fact, he dodges this question ‘
You have picked out the quote which has often frustrated me. Macmurray starts to look at the question then it is almost as though he says ‘If you want more on this go and read Kierkegaard’. In a sense this is fair enough.. Kierkegaard does spend much of his writing debunking Hegelian dialectic, but he does it in a rather quirky idiosyncratic way. It would be good to have Macmurray’s sharp analysis of it. Macmurray in ‘Self as Agent’ tends to assume the reader is familiar with dialectic logic: he is much more interested in presenting the new form of logic. In a sense this is typical of Macmurray’s style: he uses a big brush and draws the outline. It is left to the reader to fill in the details.
What Macmurray does do is to present a very clear exposition of the form of the personal. Although the form of the personal is clearly very different from organic logic, I agree that more teasing out of the nature of and differences between organic and personal logic would be very useful!
2 Thought and behaviour
Ivan writes ‘suppose we write the positive as behaviour, the negative as thought and the synthesis of the two as agency’. This is a good question it seems to me. It can only be answered well by really understanding where Macmurray is coming from.. Personally, I find something very seductive about organic logic and could easily slip into propositions of this kind. I also think that Macmurray is right in his thinking. I am not sure that I can articulate it clearly right now – at least not in a few words.
It seems to me that the question Ivan is asking is just another reframing of the question: can mind ( ie thought) and body (ie behaviour) be understood as being in dialectal relation? Is their unity an organic one?
Macmurray would argue that mere thought and mere behaviour are both abstractions: they are what we get when we withdraw from full intentional practical engagement with the world When we need to withdraw into reflective mode, (say to puzzle over a thorny problem which has arisen in our practical life,) we do this by repressing our practical intention. Our intention become theoretical, guided by our need to solve the problem, and practical life goes into auto-pilot for a while- it becomes ‘mere behaviour’ governed by habit (what Macmurray calls motive) rather than intention. The dualism – the bifurcation of mind and body – is not a matter of fact, but arises from the intentional withdrawal from action. Action, of course, for Macmurray always includes thought.
Macmurray would argue that if we start with the notions of thought and behaviour, we are implicitly starting from the egocentric perspective of ‘the thinker’. From the cogito perspective we are trapped by the mindset that thought and behaviour are somehow basic building blocks from which we can build understanding, whereas they should more properly be seen as abstractions – arising from the negative phase of withdrawal from action.
For Macmurray then , thought as an isolated element arises when we repress our practical intention so that we can devote our energy to reflection (in order that we can return to practical engagement with more finely tuned understanding). And behaviour is our effort to maintain engagement with the world when our attention is elsewhere: it is governed by motive rather than intention. Macmurray would argue that agency can not be inferred, or synthesised from mere thought and behaviour. To use an analogy from physics, it is a bit like saying circular motion is arises from a synthesis of centrifugal and centripetal forces! (sorry I realise that subtly of that analogy is lost on anyone who is not familiar with dynamics)
Macmurray would go on to argue that if we try to use organic logic to model agency, we lose the notion of intention, because organic logic can only model process. Now this would take much longer to unpick. I do discuss it a bit below. But a final note on this: I do not see Macmurray as being ‘against’ organic logic per se. The sociologist, for instance, is interested in the element of human behaviour which is predictable - roles, norms, institutions, social meaning. Macmurray implies that organic logic is quite adequate for modelling this aspect personal reality. I suspect he would approve (at least in principle) of Berger and Luckman’s dialectical understanding of society in their classic text ‘The Social Construction of Reality’.
3 There is much to be said for the view that Kant’s thinking is …. dialectical.
Though I have a reasonable familiarity with Kant I would not count myself as a Kantian scholar. Sartre in ‘Being and Nothingness’ makes a very interesting reference to Kant. In his discussion of his notion of ‘negatites’ he writes ‘Kant caught a glimpse of their significance when he spoke of regulative concepts.. as types of syntheses of negative and positive in which negation is the condition of positivity. This is a bit of sidetrack from your argument but one which interests me. To what extent did Kant anticipate Macmurray’s new logic? Why does Macmurray not make a reference to this aspect of Kant’s thinking. I would be very grateful for anyone out there who might be able to give more of insight into Kant’s thinking here, or some references?
4 Organic logic and the new logic
Ivan writes ‘In what way is the new logic different from a [organic?] synthesis of opposites’.
Another big question. I haven’t space to properly try to answer it here. The differences can be identified on purely logical grounds: the new logic is one in which the positive contains and is constituted by it own negation, whereas in organic logic positive and negative harmonise/balance/interact to contribute to the organic whole. But this is pretty abstract. You could say perhaps that whereas organic logic has an intrinsically symmetrical quality to it, the new logic is fundamentally asymmetrical.
For Macmurray, organic logic can model the unity of form (as in a work of art) or the unity of development. Each part interacts with the others and contributes to the whole through balance, harmony or through a process of alternate progressive development.. But personal reality has more to do with relationship than with form or process, and the new logic seeks (amongst other things) to model the logical nature of relationship. For example, in Macmurrays thinking, I meet the world though action. But I can only know that I am in relation with the world (though action), by also being distanced from it through thought. To know that I am in relation to the world, I must also not be in relation to it! The positive ‘being in relation’ and its negation do not contribute equally to the whole. The negation in a sense illuminates the fact that we are in relation.
(Interestingly Sartre in Being and Nothingness talks about negation being the condition of positivity, and comes up with some arguments quite similar to Macmurray. He writes when discussing negitities:’Negation is the cement which realises this unity)
I know this is probably only restating what you know already, and does not answer your question. But like I said it is a big question. I will maybe write a separate post on this.
5 What is dialectic logic?
Ivan writes ‘What is dialectic logic?’ Mmm… You like asking the difficult questions. Yes there are few books which go anywhere near describing it well. There is definitely gap in the market here! I would say that our understanding of the nature of organic logic (at least in the west) is fairly much in its infancy: it is perhaps more like mathematics in the Pythagorean era. We tend to see it either as quirky or odd, or mystical and perhaps rather precious (especially the eastern versions of it).
Here are a few of my thoughts.
Dialectic logic (or more generically organic logic) is, as I see it, a conceptual tool which, like mathematics, helps us to model the world. Organic logic can model qualitative differences. Organic logic can be thought of dynamically as modelling a process of development, or more statically as representation a harmony of opposites which make a wholeness. In both cases it is more concerned with form and process rather than structure. It has a logical construction as precise as mathematics, but our understanding of it is yet fairly crude.
My sense is that we shall not make much progress with organic logic until we have developed a notation for it. Afterall, the development of maths has gone hand in hand with notation. It took hundreds of years for a number system to evolve. The number zero was quite late on the scene. Algebraic and graphical notation are really quite recent. It is easy to forget that even in the early 17th century there was no algebraic notion – it all had to be written out in words! Maths notation allowed further exploration and understanding of its nature and also made it the powerful generic tool it has become. To develop a notation of organic logic would force us to be clear about its logical structure. Verbal accounts are often somewhat baffling.
As an aside, in the 70s I spent quite a lot of time on the problem of notation for both organic logic and Macmurray’s new logic. I found it a very fruitful line of enquiry. I came up with a graphical notation for organic logic which I used for modelling things as diverse as jokes, sonata form, economic systems, quantum physics and technological innovation! I have always find the academic world very resistant to the idea of notation. I suspect Macmurray would have been to – he was very content with words.
I think that one of the big obstacles for developing understanding of organic logic has been that there is a temptation to seek to understand (and criticise) it by reference to specific attempt to use it. It is like criticising maths because someone cheats with it, or to dismiss the value of numbers because you have only ever seen numbers used for counting sheep (and you are not a shepherd!) Similarly, if the conclusions that Marx and Hegel draw are questionable, this does not necessarily mean that dialectic logic is flawed per se.
( When I was very small I distrusted maths! My older brother would say when dividing up some chocolate, ‘would you like one piece or three pieces?’ So I would say ‘3 pieces please’, so he would break off 3 tiny pieces and keep the rest for himself. When I complained he would say ‘ but you have 3 pieces and I only have 1 – you’ve go more than me!’ I found it hard to argue with this. I could have been tempted to say that maths was critically flawed! )
6 Macmurray’s use (misuse?) of dialectic logic
I agree with quite a lot of what you say about Macmurray use of dialectic logic. In his book Creative Society he seems very bent on explaining things in terms of dialectic logic. This has puzzled me too. I do not intend to go so far as to justify his use of dialectic logic in this context. Here are a few thoughts though.
It took Macmurray a while to articulate the form of the personal. He does not junk organic logic at any point and I do not see that as his intention. His point is that it is inadequate for grasping the unity of reality. Reality at its most concrete is personal and not merely organic or mechancal. His argument seems to be: In so far as reality is process, then organic logic is fine. In so far as reality is mechanical, then mathematical logic is fine. In other words: use the right tools for the job! For example when we are looking only at society (the negative phase of community), then organic logic is OK. Similarly he clearly implies that our emotional lives, artistic sensibility etc can be modelled using organic logic
The other point is one which is a bit tricky to explain. There is a sense in which all three forms of logic are operating at the same time. As a person I have personal nature But I am also organic and material. If I want to understand my trajectory as human cannon, it is perfectly permissible to make mathematical calculations about my movement. My life could depend on it!! But this does not mean that all my actions can be understood mathematically. There is a sense in which any aspect of reality can be examined using mechanical, organic or personal logic to model it, depending what our purpose is. To push a point. there is value in a behaviourist – ie stimulus response - understanding of human behaviour. Behaviourist therapies have made great strides with helping people with phobias for example. It is not appropriate, however, to build a metaphysics with it.
I might be overstating it a bit in the paragraph above (never thought I would argue in favour of behaviourism!!), but I think the point is relevant.
7 The two phases: formulation and manipulation
Ivan writes ‘But for brevity, I will avoid the controversy and look at page 93 of 'Self as Agent'.’
Quote…..
‘On this view, symbolic logic is the logic of inference and can be performed by a machine, while dialectical logic is the logic of formulation…..’
…
I do not have my copy of Self as Agent at hand as I have leant it out. I do not have a problem with the text from Macmurray which you quote. As far as I can remember he is simply stating that in order to solve a problem, we must first model it adequately (formulation) and then do some kind of reflective processing it in order to gain a new understanding (manipulation). There is nothing particularly controversial about this. Whatever choice of thinking tool we use – mathematical, dialectical or systems thinking etc. we must first seek to build a model which adequately represents the real situation relative to our purposes. We are then ready to do the reflective processing which allows us to look at the situation in new way, ie to solve the problem. In maths this is often though algebraic manipulation. Finally we must refer our ‘solution’ back to the real situation and test it to see if we truly have some new understanding. In other words, does it work (empiricism). If it does not then we have to find the source of our error.
Phew! that was a long post! I have not answered all your questions by any means, but it has helped me to articulate some of my thoughts. It was really good to have some challenging questions. Hope this has provoked a few thoughts in you.
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 04/07/2005 : 18:46:52
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Hi Paul,
Maybe my post was too long. I'll give a shortened version
of it as a quick reply and return to some of the things you
say later.
I am maintaining that there is a contradiction in the
middle of MacMurray's thought that works like this.
His 'metaphysic' allows three levels of reality - material,
organic, and personal and it is for this reason that he needs
a third logic. Human life is personal or superorganic and so
can not be fully described in terms of organic or dialectical
logic.
However, in the two books in which he deals most explicitly
with general history, namely 'Creative Society' and 'Clue to
History', his reasoning about history is thoroughly dialectic,
and in places obviously wrong. He does, of course, mention
God's action in history, but this remains a mention. It is in
no way 'organically' connected to his dialectic.
(In particular, in the last paragraph of 'Clue to History',
it is the 'negation of the negation', and not, say, the
salvation of God, that guarantees a socialist commonwealth of
the World. (Which failed to emerge). What's the difference
between that and the Morris fiction that has a socialist
Britain inaugurated in 1952 ? Only this: Morris knew he was
writing fiction.)
============================================================
So ? Principal point briefly put. MacMurray claims to
be superseding organic philosophies. However, when he turns
to actual history he moves organic logic centre stage.
============================================================
One of the technical consequences of this is that it is
impossible to state clearly the relation between dialectical
and personal logic. Moreover, he uses dialectic to explain
the necessity for his new logic. (That was the point of the
quotation about Kant).
I have discussed this point with MacMurray's biographer and
feel sure that if there were any evidence in the archive that
MacMurray even realized this flaw, I should have been told
of it. MacMurry, see-saws, but he doesn't get clear about it.
I would, as it happens, be interested in your attempts at
a notation. (I am of the view that Philosophy is not a
'subject' - it's a conversation between a bunch of eccentrics
who share the yen to invent the perfect language. Needless
to say, they spend most of their time talking past one
another, just like partisans of computer languages.)
You also say 'Personally, I find something very seductive
about organic logic...' Wanna be cured ? Try Sartre's
'Critique of Dialectical Reasoning'. That'll put you off it
for life.
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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Paul_Gee
9 Posts |
Posted - 05/07/2005 : 16:58:17
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Hi Ivan
I get your point much more clearly now.
Ivan writes: “So ? Principal point briefly put. MacMurray claims to
be superseding organic philosophies. However, when he turns
to actual history he moves organic logic centre stage.”
Here are a few points in response to that:
1 The nature of history difficult to understand.
Although history is clearly of great interest to Macmurray I do not think he comes to as mature an understanding of its nature as he did say for religion. He talks a great deal about science, art and religion and the relationship between them, but relatively little about history. It is only in the last chapter of Self as Agent that he starts to touch on it in any depth. I have always felt frustrated that he does not come back to it in Persons in Relation. . I have some thoughts on the nature of his difficulty and how it might be resolved, but that would be another post.
2 His ideas develop over time
Yes I agree he uses dialectic logic to look at history in ‘Creative Society’ and ‘A clue to History’. It should be remembered of course that these are early books: 1935 and 1938 ( I believe it took him while to get A clue to History published). He is very steeped in his attempts to sift out what is useful and unuseful in Marx. This is still quite early on in his thinking. Also this was in the socialist cultural backcloth of the 30s! It takes him a while to refine his ideas. It is not until ‘Self as Agent’ (published 20 years later) that he is able to articulate clearly his view that history is not primarily a process (organic) but one action.
3 Organic logic still valid
Macmurray does not discard organic logic, merely points out its limitations. Although by ‘Self as Agent’, he has rejected organic logic as a model by which to give a ‘complete’ expression of the nature of history, he clearly implies that it quite adequate for representing social change in so far as we act according to motive ( habit, norms, roles etc). The social world is the predictable backcloth with both negates and supports the personal (the spontaneity of community). It is the peculiar paradox of the form of the personal that it embraces its own negative. Therefore personal logic includes organic logic. It is permissible to use organic logic to model aspects of the world, including history, as long as we realise its limitations.
So to summarise my response to this bit.
- I think Macmurray struggles to articulate the nature of history
- I am prepared to forgive Macmurray for using organic logic in his early work (if it is because he has not yet articulated a more adequate way to express his thinking at that stage).
- I can even legitimate his using organic logic (to some extent), but I would like him to have done this with more awareness, or to have commented on the limitations. ( Although Macmurray makes some quite humble remarks from time to time, I also suspect he did not like admitting to limitations!!)
Ivan writes “One of the technical consequences of this is that it is
impossible to state clearly the relation between dialectical
and personal logic. “
Mmmm… would need you to clarify that point. .
Surely you would allow for Macmurray’s thought to develop. The Gifford lectures are the most mature expression of his thinking to my mind. Yes he refers back to Interpreting the Universe, otherwise it is pretty much refined thinking. I find in it quite a cogent (if embryonic) exploration of the logical relation between organic and personal logic. Just because at an early stage of his thinking he focused on the dialectical aspect of history, this surely does not invalidate his later thinking.
To put it very briefly, in the Self as Agent, Macmurray articulates the form of the personal from first principles. He sees his personal logic as the form of the universe. Organic and material logic can only be understood as being derived from form of the personal by a process of abstraction. From my understanding of him, (to put it rather crudely) organic logic is what you get when you pay attention only to the negative moment of the form of the personal, so tha the bi- polar negative become figural. Furthermore, by paying attention only to by one pole of the organic system, you get material logic. It is true that Macmurray only gives the broadbrush outline and some jigsaw pieces, but I do not see the critical flaw that you do.
Ivan writes “Moreover, he uses dialectic to explain the necessity for his new logic. (That was the point of the quotation about Kant).
Again I am not sure that I got this properly. I do not see Macmurray using dialectic logic to explain the necessity of his new logic. Certainly a creative process – artistic or intellectual - has a dialectic nature .. the bringing together of seemingly unrelated elements into a new whole, or the progressive refinement of an idea though disagreement, reevaluation, integration etc. It is fine for new thinking to come out of a dialectical process. I do not see any inconsistency in this. It is part of the nature of creative thinking.
Macmurray’s point is that though a creative reflective process (eg art or the creative part of philosophical thinking) may have an organic nature, the intention which drives it must be consistent (however circuitously) with the personal nature of universe, if we want to end up with rational knowledge. What matters is the intentional reference of our reflection to the practical. As Macmurray would say:all meaningful thinking is for the sake of action, all meaningful action for the sake of friendship.. (or something like that) Are we prepared to walk our talk in friendship?
Not sure if this addresses your point. Maybe I am missing your point! But I am enjoying the opportunity to try to sharpen my thinking. You ask good questions!
Paul Gee
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 07/07/2005 : 00:17:01
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Hi Paul,
I shall pause before answering your post - if only to avoid
wasted attempts at point-scoring. It is obvious that we
are coming from different places.
Meantime, I observe that the fact that I am concerned mainly
with what I, (perhaps wrongly), take to be MacMurray's errors
or contradictions implies no lack of respect. I have been
reading him for forty years - a thing I wouldn't bother
doing if I was convinced that he was simply wrong.
There is a dialectic, of a probably non-organic kind, going
on here. As a mathematician(amateur) I know that Euclid is
chock full of errors. As a mathematician I also know that if
Euclid hadn't opened our eyes in the first place, none of us
would be able to see them.
Philosphy is like that, only more so. The questions remain,
most answers are very short-lived.
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 10/07/2005 : 19:48:09
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>1 The nature of history difficult to understand.
We don't disagree about that. How could it be otherwise ?
We last about threescore and ten in a process with no
known beginning and no known end.
>I do not think he comes to as mature an understanding of
>its nature as he did say for religion.
We probably do disagree about that, but it might be a
separate topic.
>He talks a great deal about science, art and religion and
>the relationship between them, but relatively little about
>history. It is only in the last chapter of Self as Agent
>that he starts to touch on it in any depth.
Er - excuse me. He wrote a book called 'Clue to History'.
Did he 'touch on it in any depth' there ? And, if so, why
don't his conclusions get a reprise in that last chapter
'The World as One Action' ?
>2 His ideas develop over time
They don't all that much. If you read 'Interpreting the
Universe' (1933) it is virtually a program for the Giffords
which were published in the fifties. The main difference
is that God scarcely rates a mention in the first. And
even in the Giffords he clearly says that he is indirectly
conforming to the founder's wishes. It is also true that
organic logic gets more coverage in the first.
>It is not until ‘Self as Agent’ (published 20 years
>later) that he is able to articulate clearly his view that
>history is not primarily a process (organic) but one action.
I believe this opinion can be controverted by a close reading
of 'Interpreting the Universe' and 'Clue to History'.
'Interpreting the Universe' Faber & Faber 2nd ed. 1936 p.121
(The first edition was published in 1933)
"It may be possible to represent subjective and irrational
forms of consciousness in terms of the biological
unity-pattern. But it is certainly not possible to represent
the nature of rational or objective consciousness as we know
it in immediate experience, through this form of symbolism.
Human consciousness is not organic."
'Interpreting the Universe' Faber & Faber 2nd ed. 1936 p.121
MacMurray is clear here, and elswhere in this book that he
is looking for something that cannot be described by organic
logic. (Quotations could be multiplied).
Further in a central portion of 'Clue to History' we have
the following :-
'Clue to History'(SCM Press Fourth edition p. 55ff)
" THE DISCOVERY OF THE PERSONAL
The discovery which Jesus made was the discovery that
human life is personal...
... To say that human life is personal is primarily to
deny that human life is organic, or that it can be treated
as differing from animal life only in degree not in kind. "
If you wanted to be cruel here you could say that Jesus was
who he was because he discovered MacMurray's philosophy.
And notice, the discovery is negative and contentless. The
non-organic could mean either the material or the
superorganic. Obviously MacMurray means the latter, but
he doesn't say much about it or specify. Nor does he quote
the Gospels to describe how Jesus arrived at this
remarkably MacMurrayan destination.
But nevertheless, in the last paragraph of the same book,
quoted in my first post, it is the 'negation of the negation',
(whatever that may mean - two minuses make a plus ?),
and *not* the salvation of God which guarantees a socialist
commonwealth of the world, (which did not happen).
Now the negation of the negation is a piece of machinery from
organic or dialectical logic. In 'Interpreting the Universe'
and the Giffords, dialectical logic is a 'unity pattern', a
sort of logical device we use to understand things organic.
In 'Clue to History' and 'Creative Society' it suddenly becomes
a sort of engine driving history, and moreover driving it to
the approved conclusion.
This may look like development to you. It looks like see-saw
to me; contradiction in fact. (Philosophers, not excluding
this amateur, can be caught out doing this all the time!)
>3 Organic logic still valid
>Macmurray does not discard organic logic, merely points out
>its limitations. Although by ‘Self as Agent’, he has rejected
>organic logic as a model by which to give a ‘complete’ expression
>of the nature of history, he clearly implies that it is quite
>adequate for representing social change in so far as we act
>according to motive (habit, norms, roles etc). The social world
>is the predictable backcloth with both negates and supports the
>personal (the spontaneity of community). It is the peculiar
>paradox of the form of the personal that it embraces its own
>negative. Therefore personal logic includes organic logic. It
>is permissible to use organic logic to model aspects of the
>world, including history, as long as we realise its limitations.
This defense would be just fine if either you or MacMurray dealt
closely in examples. But you don't. In the one relevant example
he does discuss in detail (the intentions of Jesus and his
cooperation with the will of God) he doesn't separate and
integrate the organic and personal aspects of the history, he
simply flip-flops from one to the other. Moreover, the final
goal, which proved much more elusive than he imagined when
he wrote the final paragraph of 'Clue to History', is brought
about by 'the negation of the negation'. I.e. organic
causality generates a state that (if it happened) would not
be describable in purely organic terms.
It's all very well to talk about the validity of organic logic,
but just consider its recent history. From the early years of
the eighteenth century until the present there is a rich crop
of philosophies of development/progress/evolution. They can
be driven to almost any destination you please, socialist
capitalist, Christian, atheist; you can have progress to
perfection with Alfred Russell Wallace or decline with
Oswald Spengler &c. &c. In short, organic metaphor
can be used to drive almost any conclusion that appeals.
Where, exactly, do we look for truth in all that?
The fact of contemporary relevance about this is probably
that most of this philosophy, even where it is economic,
is non-ecological. (In fact, it's arguable that the most
important question in 'organic logic' is what natural
selection will do to a species that can't connect economics
and ecology.)
Is it any wonder that last century saw movements of
contemptuous scepticism ?
===============================================================
No, MacMurray does not discard organic logic, but he does use
it to arrive at erroneous conclusions, and that, in spite of
the fact that his declared goal from his earliest philosophical
work is a different kind of philosophy. That's the
contradiction.
===============================================================
(And, by the bye, the 'predictable backcloth' is not quite
as predictable as it used to be. That's why we're waging a
'war on terror' isn't it ? If ecological problems really
start to bite it will get even less predictable.)
Perhaps I can ask you one question. What would MacMurray
have to say before you saw a contradiction as opposed to a
'dialectical development' ?
>It is the peculiar paradox of the form of the personal that
>it embraces its own negative.
So we may now say p.~p and get away with it ?
RESTATING THE QUESTION
I haven't forgotten that the question at the head of this
thread is about dialectical logic and its relation to
personal logic. My arguments of this post permit an
alternative statement of the question.
MacMurray is clearly a christian (very unorthodox). However,
the man who believed in the coming of the kingdom didn't
always get away from the boy who believed it might come next
week. We could ask how much of MacMurray's teaching about
dialectic can we rescue from that boy ?
Again, we could ask, is MacMurray a creationist or an
evolutionist. The obvious answer is 'a bit of both'. You
could say that I'm claiming the bits 'don't fit' and asking
if they can be made to.
There is a chapter, which you haven't mentioned, in which he
appears to offer to address some of my questions - namely
chapter VI of 'Creative Society'. I'm still trying to figure
out how much it actually says.
Cheers
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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Paul_Gee
9 Posts |
Posted - 15/07/2005 : 18:30:12
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MB if browser set with large print, this post will not fit on page.
Hi Ivan
I enjoy your posts. Your challenges are good. I am not attached to a particular perspective. I am happy to write my responses, and to follow the line of thinking which come from yours. I am not sure how satisfactory you will find this. But it is the best I can do for the moment!.
It is a while since I read ‘Clue to History’ and ‘Creative Society’. They are the two books I struggle the most with. Quite apart from the points you raise there are others I struggle with: his views on pacifism, his embracing of an apocalyptic perspective etc. In reading Macmurray I have found it fruitful to flag up what I find difficult and try to understand where Macmurray is coming from. In his other books this has been a good strategy. In these books, however, I get more stuck. I do see the main point you are making.
To give you an adequate reply I would need reread these books. I am going off travelling in a couple of weeks, so that might be while before I do that! I do not have time to answer all your points, but here are a few thoughts.
1 Macmurray’s understanding of the nature of history
Yes he has written ‘Clue to History’. I guess I see the focus in this more on an interpretation of history rather than on the its philosophical nature (though of course he does look at this as well). It is a while since I read it. My memory is that it is not until ‘Self as Agent’ that he looks more at the questions “If history both particularises and generalises, is it art and science? How can it be modelled?, What is its logical structure?, how can it be thought.? How is it related to art, science and religion? etc” In contrast he talks endlessly about the nature of art, science and religion (Reason and emotion’, ‘the structure of religious experience’, ‘Persons in Relation’ etc) These three modes of reflection fit very neatly into his three fold understanding of the world, (a key unifying theme in all his work). Now history as a mode of reflection does not fit neatly into this ‘three fold’ model. I do not see him coming to terms with its philosophical nature - he seems to waver between an organic and personal understanding of it. Now is this a fatal flaw in his philosophy, or is history a slippery beast for Macmurray to grasp? (or am I simply not understanding his argument well)
Macmurray’s confused thinking?
It seems to me that in the Clue to History, perhaps because he has not yet articulated the logical form of the personal with the clarity of the Giffords, he seems to confuse a number of elements.
In the Gifford lectures, Macmurray make much of the rhythm of withdrawal and return between the positive and negative poles of the form of the personal. (Interestingly I think he get the term from the historian Toynbee) . At its simplest: We withdraw into reflection when we encounter a problem (negation of action) and return to full engagement with world when we have solved the problem (the positive practical engagement which includes its negation ie reflection). This is not a dialectic interaction. There is not a tension between thought and action which produces change.
Again in the Giffords he argues that we withdraw into fear of the other when our attempts to love fail. We return again to positive engagement with the other when we have overcome our fear eg by forgiveness and reconciliation. Again love and fear are not in dialectic relation even though there is a rhythm of movement between the poles. Love always includes fear. When we return to love, we engage at a deeper level, and this in turn means that there is a deeper potential for fear.
In Clue to History and Creative Society, the same themes are expressed, except that he does not use the concept of ‘withdrawal and return’. I would need reread these books carefully, but here are a few hunches as to where confusion arises. . It seems to me that the negation of the negation of which you speak (eg last chapter of CtoH) is not a dialectic relation, but a rhythm of movement between the ‘personal poles’: a return from fear (fascist mode of morality) back towards love (Jewish consciousness) . Now if Macmurray is referring to this relation as dialectical, he is clearly introducing a confusion into the argument.
In Creative Society he seems keen to make the distinction:. On p100 (Ch 4), he wants to make a clear distinction between organic logic and the logic of the personal.
‘I have repeated this point….. to define the formal difference between the dialectical, or organic, conception of human life, and the personal, or religious one. In a dialectical process there is a succession of positive and negative phases. The thesis produces its own antithesis, and the tension between the two results finally in their synthesis, which is the production of a new and wider affirmation at higher level. But in the eternal aspect of human life, alternation of positive and negative phases gives place to a unification of positive and negative in which both are present and together’ Here he is attempting to distinguishing organic logic from what he later calls the form of the personal . The problem is he goes on the refer to this ‘alternation of positive and negative phases’ as a dialectic
Only in the next chapter he writes
P130 ‘Actually this struggle would be dialectal because the antithesis of relgion is pseudo religion, and the dialectic in the religious field is always in the form of a struggle between the real and the unreal forms or between real and unreal elements within the general form.’ Now here he is clearly talking about the poles of personal logic: real religion is love oriented, which contains and is constituted by its own negation, fear. Yet he appears to be using the language of organic logic. This is confusing. Yes there is an interaction between the poles, but is not a dialectical one(he has already made this point above. The only excuse I can find is that he is using the word ‘dialectic’ here as a more generic philosophical term meaning ‘a conversation of opposites’ rather than a technical term describing organic logic. Still confusing!
The situation is complicated because in the negative mode – one dominated by fear – the world is split: inner and outer worlds become bifurcated, head and heart appear to be in opposition. Now the question arises ‘Is it permissible to understand the tension between these split off parts in the negative phase, organically? It seems to me that that is what Macmurray does. In Creative Society he talks about a tension between communist and pseudo-christianity apperception of the world, the one more materialist (outer world) and one more idealistic (innerworld) in orientation. He seems to see this as a dialectical relation.. I do get confused here.
In P in R, Macmurray identifies two typical ‘fear-orientated’ modes of society, informed by either contemplative or pragmatic modes of morality. To put Macmurray’s argument very crudely, when one is expressed, the other is either repressed (or sits uneasily and ambivolently next to it). The repressed bit finds expression unconsciously. A regime which ideologically gives absolute power to the people (soviet Russia) is also the most tyrannical, it give absolute power to the state. Examples of the mismatch between the conscious intention and unconscious expression are rife. . Macmurray is clear that the bipolar negative modes have an ambivalent relation to one another; in places he implies that the relation is a dialectical relation.
Again these themes are explored in ‘Creative Society’ n P101 Ch4 he identifies the two unreal forms of religion – one ‘otherworldly and idealist’ the other ‘a religion seeking secular power’ He writes: ‘These two forms are constituted by the introduction of that dualism which dissociates the inner life from the outer’ …..‘ in the history of the Christian Church these two forms of pseudo-Christianithy are, as we might expect, always found more or less together, but they have a natural affinity with the two sides of the dialectic which we have already considered.’ He goes on to explain that pseudo-Christianity which emphasises institutions is ‘a religion of power’, whereas where the emphasis is on the inner life it tends to I’dealism and otherworldliness’. So here we have a dialectic between the opposed, split-off, fear-orientated aspects (ie the bipolar negative elements of the form of the personal).
Again I come back to the question, does this confusion indicate a fundamental flaw in Macmurray’s thinking, which means that the rest of his ideas have no foundation? I would need to think much more deeply about this in order to come to an answer. I am inclined to the view that Macmurray (at the time of writing these books) has not sufficiently learnt how to model his thinking to be able to make an ‘interpretation’ of history which is free from some confused thinking. When writing these books , he has been immersed in Marx, and in both ‘CS’ and ‘C to H’ he seems to be both differentiating himself from Marx whilst also using the Marx’s notion of dialectic with enthusiasm, and perhaps in rather a cavalier fashion? The thing I find puzzlng, is that in my experience, Macmurray is very careful in his use of words, and tries to be very precise.
The error of Organic logic?
Just one final point. I am not sure that we can criticise organic logic because theorists use it to support their own bias. Hegel and Marx famously used organic logic to make diametrically opposite interpretations of history. It seems to me that just because organic logic can be used to support different theories and lead to different conclusions, is not the fault of organic logic . Afterall Maths can be used to support conflicting scientific theories. This does not mean maths is at fault per se. It is of course true that attachment to a particular way of modelling reality can give a mindset which prevents us from seeing the flaws in our thinking. Again this applies equally to the use of maths as to the use of organic logic. Einstien’s genius was as much his recognition that space/time could be modelled using the recently developed geometry of curved space, which up till then had been a mathematical curiosity with no obvious application. But just because Einstien’s model is elegant does not meant it is right. It had to be verified through experiement. Similarly Macmurray would argue I suspect that any interpretation of history (infact any attempt at rational knowledge) is always provisional. Knowledge must be verified (ie its plausibility verified) empirically. The more our actions are informed by an understanding which is in tune with nature of reality, the more successful our actions will ultimately be. .(And conversely.. ) Historical reflection can come up with plausible interpretations. Though we can attempt to evaluate interpretations theoretically, ultimately our understanding can only be verified in practice. That at least is my understanding of Macmurray’s approach.
This has turned into another long post! Bye the way, I take the view that amateur philosophers (I prefer the term ‘non professional’) are far more’s likely have a sense of the significance of Macmurray philosophy than professionals. Academics are far too constrained by the mind set of academia! Keep asking your difficult questions!!.…..
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 21/07/2005 : 23:28:20
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>It is a while since I read ‘Clue to History’ and
>‘Creative Society’. They are the two books I struggle
>the most with.
Me too. In fact I only acquired them recently by
net-shopping. They have been out of print for a long
time, and whatever the outcome of our musings I think
that sticking to the MacMurray in print gives a
deceptive impression.
>To give you an adequate reply I would need reread these
>books.
>1 Macmurray’s understanding of the nature of history
>Yes he has written ‘Clue to History’. I guess I see
>the focus in this more on an interpretation of history
>rather than on the its philosophical nature (though of
>course he does look at this as well).
We don't disagree about that.
>It is a while since I read it. My memory is that it is
>not until ‘Self as Agent’ that he looks more at the
>questions 'If history both particularises and generalises,
>is it art and science? How can it be modelled?, What is
>its logical structure?, how can it be thought? How is it
>related to art, science and religion? etc' In contrast
>he talks endlessly about the nature of art, science and
>religion (Reason and emotion’, ‘the structure of religious
>experience’, ‘Persons in Relation’ etc) These three modes
>of reflection fit very neatly into his three fold
>understanding of the world, (a key unifying theme in all
>his work). Now history as a mode of reflection does not
>fit neatly into this ‘three fold’ model. I do not see him
>coming to terms with its philosophical nature - he seems
>to waver between an organic and personal understanding of
>it. Now is this a fatal flaw in his philosophy, or is
>history a slippery beast for Macmurray to grasp?
>(or am I simply not understanding his argument well)
Well, I won't try to back anybody into the 'fatal flaw'
corner, let's just say that there is a gap here. The word
'waver' hits it. Tho' dialectic is central to the argument
in 'Creative Society' and also 'Clue to History' their
contents do not get any kind of reprise or refutation in
the Giffords. They are simply dropped.
In those volumes dialectic is either a logic of
formulation, (Self as Agent), or a sort of trick whereby
Rousseauist views of society construct their idealist
myths. (See the two index entries for 'dialectic' in
'Persons in Relation') In short, while dialectic is
central to history in 'Creative Society' and 'Clue to
History' it simply fades from view in 'Persons in
Relation' except as an explanation of a certain kind of
error.
My own opinion about MacMurray's grasp of the 'slippery
beast' is this. With one exception that I'll come to,
MacMurray is uncomfortable with History because he is
uncomfortable with Identity. (This is very odd for a
philosopher of personality!) Even though he is
discussing the man who is arguably the, or a, central
identity in European history, Jesus of Nazareth,
MacMurray is rather dull. What he presents is an
Hegelian hero - the meaning of life becoming conscious
of itself in a particular person. This is dogmatically
stated. The statement is uncovincing because we do not
hear MacMurray discovering the meaning of life as he
thinks about this person. He merely tells us that this
is where the meaning of life is to be found, or rather
finds itself. This is lecture, not evangelism, but,
paradoxically, because it is so, it is unconvincing.
(Almost the only time in MacMurray's philosophical
writing where we meet anybody other than MacMurray
is in the chapter 'Kant and the Romantics' in
'Self as Agent' where he animates a discussion between
several engaged individuals. Even that is fairly
abstract.)
>Macmurray’s confused thinking?
>It seems to me that in the Clue to History, perhaps
>because he has not yet articulated the logical form
>of the personal with the clarity of the Giffords, he
>seems to confuse a number of elements. In the Gifford
>lectures, Macmurray make much of the rhythm of withdrawal
>and return between the positive and negative poles of
>the form of the personal. (Interestingly I think he get
>the term from the historian Toynbee). At its simplest:
>We withdraw into reflection when we encounter a problem
>(negation of action) and return to full engagement with
>world when we have solved the problem (the positive
>practical engagement which includes its negation ie
>reflection). This is not a dialectic interaction. There
>is not a tension between thought and action which
>produces change.
I haven't yet tried to track the confusions of
'Clue to History' in any detail. But the shocks of
that last paragraph stick out like a sore thumb. I'm
currently tracking the confusions in 'Creative Society'
jusqu'aux yeux. After all, he does make a sort of effort
to meet my main point here. (I also plan that, when I
have those two more under my belt, I will compare them
with Schweitzer's much more substantial 'Quest of the
Historical Jesus')
As I read those last chapters of 'Creative Society' I am
slowing down. I may be right or partly right in my
criticism, but there is a lot going on here that I only
dimly understand. And I'm not going to pretend to
understand what I don't.
However, if, as you say, he was confused here because
he had not yet articulated the form of the personal,
wouldn't you expect him to return to the confusion
and use it as grist if he had got it clear. That
doesn't happen. His example of an organic political
philosopher in 'Persons in Relation' isn't even
Marx, it's Rousseau, whom he doesn't quote over
generously.
>Again in the Giffords he argues that we withdraw
>into fear of the other when our attempts to love
>fail. We return again to positive engagement with
>the other when we have overcome our fear eg by
>forgiveness and reconciliation. Again love and fear
>are not in dialectic relation even though there is
>a rhythm of movement between the poles. Love always
>includes fear. When we return to love, we engage at
>a deeper level, and this in turn means that there is
>a deeper potential for fear.
We don't disagree about that. I occasionally ask
myself whether there are similar movements in groups
and societies as wholes. If so - that would be
relevant to a philosophy of history.
>In Clue to History and Creative Society, the same
>themes are expressed, except that he does not use
>the concept of ‘withdrawal and return’. I would need
>reread these books carefully, but here are a few
>hunches as to where confusion arises.
> It seems to me that the negation of the negation of
>which you speak (eg last chapter of CtoH) is not a
>dialectic relation, but a rhythm of movement between
>the ‘personal poles’: a return from fear (fascist mode
>of morality) back towards love (Jewish consciousness).
>Now if Macmurray is referring to this relation as
>dialectical, he is clearly introducing a confusion into
>the argument.
Which is roughly what I'm arguing. He does say that it
is the 'inevitable destiny' of fascism to give rise to
its opposite - a socialist commonwealth of the world.
It didn't and, by most of what MacMurray says in other
places, couldn't.
>In Creative Society he seems keen to make the distinction:.
>On p100 (Ch 4), he wants to make a clear distinction
>between organic logic and the logic of the personal.
Chapter 6 in my copy 'The Eternal and the Temporal'
>‘I have repeated this point….. to define the formal
>difference between the dialectical, or organic,
>conception of human life, and the personal, or
>religious one. In a dialectical process there is a
>succession of positive and negative phases. The thesis
>produces its own antithesis, and the tension between the
>two results finally in their synthesis, which is the
>production of a new and wider affirmation at higher
>level. But in the eternal aspect of human life,
>alternation of positive and negative phases gives
>place to a unification of positive and negative in
>which both are present and together’
>Here he is attempting to distinguishing organic logic
>from what he later calls the form of the personal.
>The problem is he goes on the refer to this
>‘alternation of positive and negative phases’ as a
>dialectic.
This may be a confusion of vocabulary - the 'positive/
negative' phases in dialectic being something different
from the 'positive/negative' elements in a person or
relationship. But, even if it is, this kind of
elementary confusion is not the sort of thing one would
expect to find in a professional philosopher.
>Only in the next chapter he writes
>P130 ‘Actually this struggle would be dialectal because the
>antithesis of relgion is pseudo religion, and the dialectic
>in the religious field is always in the form of a struggle
>between the real and the unreal forms or between real and
>unreal elements within the general form.’ Now here
>he is clearly talking about the poles of personal logic: real
>religion is love oriented, which contains and is constituted
>by its own negation, fear. Yet he appears to be using the
>language of organic logic. This is confusing. Yes there is
>an interaction between the poles, but is not a dialectical
>one(he has already made this point above. The only excuse I
>can find is that he is using the word ‘dialectic’ here as a
>more generic philosophical term meaning ‘a conversation of
>opposites’ rather than a technical term describing organic
>logic. Still confusing!
Just so! And that's why I'm slowing down. I have to track
those confusions and then try to estimate just how much of
a hole they leave in the general argument.
>The situation is complicated because in the negative mode
>' one dominated by fear ' the world is split: inner and
>outer worlds become bifurcated, head and heart appear to
>be in opposition. Now the question arises ‘Is it
>permissible to understand the tension between these split
>off parts in the negative phase, organically? It seems to me
>that that is what Macmurray does. In Creative Society he
>talks about a tension between communist and
>pseudo-christianity apperception of the world, the one more
>materialist (outer world) and one more idealistic (innerworld)
>in orientation. He seems to see this as a dialectical
>relation.. I do get confused here.
Me too.
>In P in R, Macmurray identifies two typical
>‘fear-orientated’ modes of society, informed by either
>contemplative or pragmatic modes of morality.
>To put Macmurray’s argument very crudely, when one
>is expressed, the other is either repressed (or sits
>uneasily and ambivolently next to it).
>The repressed bit finds expression unconsciously. A
>regime which ideologically gives absolute power to
>the people (soviet Russia) is also the most tyrannical,
>it give absolute power to the state. Examples of the
>mismatch between the conscious intention and unconscious
>expression are rife. . Macmurray is clear that the
>bipolar negative modes have an ambivalent relation to
>one another; in places he implies that the relation
>is a dialectical relation.
Well, at least we are finding confusion in pretty
much the same places.
>The error of Organic logic?
>Just one final point. I am not sure that we can
>criticise organic logic because theorists use it to
>support their own bias. Hegel and Marx famously used
>organic logic to make diametrically opposite
>interpretations of history. It seems to me that just
>because organic logic can be used to support different
>theories and lead to different conclusions, is not
>the fault of organic logic . Afterall Maths can be
>used to support conflicting scientific theories.
>This does not mean maths is at fault per se. It is
>of course true that attachment to a particular way of
>modelling reality can give a mindset which prevents
>us from seeing the flaws in our thinking. Again this
>applies equally to the use of maths as to the use of
>organic logic. Einstien’s genius was as much his
>recognition that space/time could be modelled using
>the recently developed geometry of curved space, which
>up till then had been a mathematical curiosity with
>no obvious application. But just because Einstien’s
>model is elegant does not meant it is right. It had
>to be verified through experiement. Similarly
>Macmurray would argue I suspect that any
>interpretation of history (infact any attempt at
>rational knowledge) is always provisional. Knowledge
>must be verified (ie its plausibility verified)
>empirically. The more our actions are informed by
>an understanding which is in tune with nature of
>reality, the more successful our actions will
>ultimately be. .(And conversely.. ) Historical
>reflection can come up with plausible
>interpretations.
>Though we can attempt to evaluate interpretations
>theoretically, ultimately our understanding can
>only be verified in practice. That at least is
>my understanding of Macmurray’s approach.
Granted all this - particularly the appeal to
verification - what becomes of an organically
structured theory when it is verifiable ? Doesn't
it then go into biology textbooks ? After all
a mathematically structured theory becomes
physics, if it gets verified and involves inertia.
If it doesn't involve inertia it is math or logic
according to choice. (Maths if your interest is
semantic, logic or 'metamathematics' if Formal).
As I say, we have found a puddle of confusion
in much the same place. I might leave this
one for a while until I've caught up with the
reading. And, as I say, I believe that if
MacMurray had been fully conscious of the
muddle here he would have cleared it up in
the Giffords. As I read him in these books,
I am mentally comparing him with people like
Raymond Williams who frequently presents
History through other people's writings.
(See 'Culture and Society', 'The Country and
the City').
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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Paul_Gee
9 Posts |
Posted - 22/07/2005 : 11:06:34
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Hi Ivan
Again lots more thoughts sparked by your reply. Interesting to see we have quite a few points of agreement. I am going to have to leave it here for now as I am going off travelling soon. Just a couple of small points
Ivan writes: tho' dialectic is central to the argument
in 'Creative Society' and also 'Clue to History' their
contents do not get any kind of reprise or refutation in
the Giffords. They are simply dropped.
Interestingly I have found no mention of dialectic in 'Clue to history'. I was quite suprised by this. Yes he uses the terms positive and negative, and sometimes speaks of a tension between the opposites. It is possible to *assume* he is talking about dialectic logic. I would need to reread this more carefully to comment more on this. CtoH was published a few years after CS. I wonder if he realised there was confusion in CS with his use of the term dialectic (which is very liberally scattered in the text)?
Ivan writes: He does say that it is the 'inevitable destiny' of fascism to give rise to its opposite - a socialist commonwealth of the world.
Yes predictions with an implied time frame are dangerous! I see where he is coming from interms of the logic of his argument in this statement. If we put in the word 'eventually' to the statement then it is simply restating the whole thesis of the book ('destiny' perhaps already implies an unknown time frame). Yes he gets rather enthusiastic (evangalistic?) Declarative statements of that kind are very much part of his rhetorical style (cf The existence of God can not rationally be denied, Science is the first sign of real Christianity etc. ) I have the feeling sometimes he is deliberatley provocative in the way he presents ideas. Interestingly some of his other predictions have come out right enough. On p219 in CtoH in Chapter headed "The progress of Europe" he writes, "We can prophesy, without hesitation, that what fascism must achieve is the unification of Europe and the destruction of the sovereign, independent State. How long this will take to work itself our we cannot say.."
To say this with such conviction in the 30s when Europe was about to tear itself apart is quite interesting!
Tempted to say much more, but that is all for now. Maybe catch up with you in September
Regards Paul
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 25/07/2005 : 20:58:24
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Hi Paul,
>>Ivan writes: tho' dialectic is central to the argument
>>in 'Creative Society' and also 'Clue to History' their
>>contents do not get any kind of reprise or refutation in
>>the Giffords. They are simply dropped.
>Interestingly I have found no mention of dialectic in
>'Clue to history'. I was quite suprised by this. Yes he
>uses the terms positive and negative, and sometimes
>speaks of a tension between the opposites. It is >possible
>to *assume* he is talking about dialectic logic. I would
>need to reread this more carefully to comment more on >this.
>CtoH was published a few years after CS. I wonder if he
>realised there was confusion in CS with his use of the
>term dialectic (which is very liberally scattered in the
>text)?
Actually, there are at least two explicit references in the
last chapter, 'The Progress of Europe'.
"Yet the Christian community is the result of the
acceptance by Gentiles fo the inner significance of the
Hebrew culture, and the Jewish community is the result
of its rejection by the Hebrews themselves. What the
two communities have in common - a principle of human
unity which transcends the unity-principle of thegeneral society in which they are embedded - sets them
in opposition to the world of which they form a part.
Within that common principle they stand in dialectical
opposition to one another, negating one another."
p. 125 in SCM Press fourth edition.
(Now go read 'Epistle to the Ephesians'!)
"Modern Europe is the dialectical antithesis of
Mediaeval Europe."
pp.151,152 in in SCM Press fourth edition.
And there is that reference to the 'negation of the
negation' together with 'inevitable destiny' in the
last paragraph.
But in spite of that, you are basically right. When
you take the two books 'Creative Society' and 'Clue
to History' together, and in that chronological order,
it is impossible not to notice that 'dialectic' is
all over the first like a rash, and only occasionally
mentioned, though at a crucial concluding point in
the second. It is impossible not to get the impression
that MacMurray is revising his approach to history
and the dialectic as he goes, and is probably rather
suspicious of his earlier enthusiasm.
>Ivan writes: He does say that it is the 'inevitable destiny'
>of fascism to give rise to its opposite - a socialist
>commonwealth of the world.
>Yes predictions with an implied time frame are dangerous!
>I see where he is coming from in terms of the logic of his
>argument in this statement. If we put in the word 'eventually'
>to the statement then it is simply restating the whole
>thesis of the book ('destiny' perhaps already implies an
>unknown time frame). Yes he gets rather enthusiastic
>(evangalistic?) Declarative statements of that kind are
>very much part of his rhetorical style (cf The existence
>of God can not rationally be denied, Science is the first
>sign of real Christianity etc. ) I have the feeling
>sometimes he is deliberatley provocative in the way he
>presents ideas. Interestingly some of his other predictions
>have come out right enough. On p219 in CtoH in Chapter
>headed "The progress of Europe" he writes, "We can prophesy,
>without hesitation, that what fascism must achieve is the
>unification of Europe and the destruction of the sovereign,
>independent State. How long this will take to work itself
>our we cannot say.."
>To say this with such conviction in the 30s when Europe
>was about to tear itself apart is quite interesting!
Yes, the prophecy of a European Union at that date is
remarkable - though recent events in Europe show that
it still appeals more to bureaucrats than working
people, particularly unemployed working people.
But we shouldn't let him totally off the hook yet. As
we have lived through the cold war, we know that we
could have been living in a nuclear winter. Moreover
that could still happen. It's probably less likely
than it used to be. It may even be necessary for the
race to pass through a catastrophe of that kind in
order for it to come to its senses. I still see
those planes hitting the towers and mutter to myself
'Babel or Babel ?'
Mac was a nice sensible soft-hearted fellow at bottom.
He probably couldn't even imagine some of the
skulduggery that was going on in the later years of
his life. I keep remembering Barbara Tuchmann's
demonstration that only three people among the
European hard-hats are recorded as having had, ahead
of time, any realistic idea about the length and
expense of World War I.
Again, I stress that although I'm critical here, it is
criticism allied to profound respect. I was brought
up as a Plymouth Brother, and in my neck of the woods,
merely asking the questions he puts to himself and
the christian tradition was regarded as evidence of
an evil lack of faith. My disagreement with some of
MacMurray's answers goes along with a profound
gratitude that somebody managed to articulate the
questions in the first place. Happy travelling.
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 07/08/2005 : 20:21:09
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Hi Paul, all
I'm going to close my contributions on this thread
for a while. What started out as a fairly sharp
looking question - the relation between MacMurray's
new logic and dialectical logic - leads, as such
questions should -into a thorny patch of textual
exegesis.
The two most relevant texts are 'Creative Society'
and 'Clue to History'. It is clear that in the
first MacMurray is an enthusiast for a dialectical
interpretation of history and for the communist
experiment in Russia. He appears, in the second
to be backing away from both enthusiasms (without
explicitly saying so). But nevertheless, his final
conclusion in the second is couched in dialectical
terms.
Clearly, like many others, MacMurray expected more
from the Russian Communist experiment than was ever
going to happen. However, I'm not yet ready to join
his opponents on this score - it was, after all a
capitalist war that put the communists in power in
the first place. And - if his anticipations were
flatly wrong on this score - we should remind
ourselves that a good many such anticipations of our
own may likely be just as wrong. Tracking MacMurray's
errors on this score is one way of looking at the
defeats of the left over the past century.
And some of the more general questions remain. Is
there a teleology of history statable in dialectical
terms ? The fact that MacMurray got his version a bit
wrong doesn't mean to say that it can't be done. Tho'
the questions involved lead to some back-breaking paths
of speculation. (See Sartre's 'Critique of Dialectical
Reason')
It is also true that these two volumes are interesting
because they represent the collision of MacMurray's
secular education and his home-brew religion. The result
is an effort to write up Jesus of Nazareth as a
proto-marxist. It is frankly unconvincing, and in
certain respects surprising. But that doesn't mean to
say that this can't be done better either.
For the moment, I'm going to be reading these two books
and rereading them - in counterpoint with Schweitzer's
'Quest of the Historical Jesus' - which I believe adds
some necessary perspective.
Cheers
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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ivansayer
20 Posts |
Posted - 23/08/2005 : 21:28:12
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Summary and End-Note
This thread began with the technical question:
What is the relation between MacMurray's new logic and
idealist or dialectical logic. If the new logical form
is 'a positive which contains, and is constituted by
its own negative' then this form should be separated
and distingiushed from the final stage of an Hegelian
synthesis which is also a sort of combination of
positive and negative elements.
The thing that makes this question difficult to
answer is that MacMurray gives no clear extended
exposition of dialectic, though there are solid
polemical statements about it in several works.
Even in 'Creative Society', the now out-of-print
work in which history is seen through dialectical
spectacles, the ideas are introduced quite brusquely,
there is no exegesis of basics to warm the reader up.
This is odd, since the book can scarcely have been
written for professional colleagues.
Roughly speaking, the book, written in 1935, is
an attempt to show that the way forward for a
troubled Europe is a synthesis - in precisely the
dialectical sense - of Communism and Christianity.
Christianity will recover some realism from the
communist emphasis on economics, while communism
will obtain a human and spiritual dimension that
its rejection of religion makes impossible.
Before we laugh, we should realize that forms
of this kind of illusion are still to be found in
contemporary political literature.
The basis of the book is MacMurray's discovery
that the historical roots of communism are, in
some senses close to Christianity.
"It seemed, indeed, that modern Communism might
well be that half of Christianity which had been
dropped by the Church in favour of an accommodation
with Rome, coming back to assert itself against the
part that had been retained. " (Search for reality
in Religion p.27 Published Friends Home Service
Committee.)
So, certain elements that had been lost from the
Christion tradition are about to be reunited to it
and, in the last chapter of 'Creative Society',
Britain is chosen as the most likely site.
None of this happened.
By the end of the book 'Clue to History' almost
all of this has disappeared from sight, although
there is still an appeal to dialectic in the final
paragraph to 'show' that the collapse of Fascism
will presage a Socialist Commonwealth of the World.
(It really is difficult to see how the collapse of
a corrupt and cruel military regime in Europe will
generate a Socialist Commonwealth of the Andaman
Islands!)
Henceforward, dialectic gets relegated to the
occasional mentions I quoted from Self as Agent.
It is a logic of formulation - which, as I pointed
out can mean anything from the assignment of
variables to the invention of an adequate language.
It is clear that MacMurray has used dialectic as
a means of putting his favourite political bets
into an attractive shape. But his way of doing so
is extremely unrealistic.
Let us suppose there is substance in his
historical appercu that Marxism seems to be
constituted by elements of Christianity that were
sidelined when Christianity became the official
religion of Rome. To convert that appercu into
an account would require much more scholarship
than MacMurray gives it. Moreover that scholarship
would be a necessary prelude to an estimate of the
likely conditions of the reunification of the
separated halves as an historical process. The
choice of the present and the local as the time
and place for that reunification without a very
solid attempt at demonstration is clearly
self-interested. (And, versions of that kind of
illusion are still about!)
Further, the fact that the reunification is not
visibly happening as a social process in no way
prevents - though it certainly makes very difficult,
the individual attempt to move in that direction,
what one may call the Franciscan alternative.
It is at this point that I find instructive and
very humbling, the contrast with Albert Schweitzer.
Schweitzer brings much more historical scholarship
to the question of who the historical Jesus was,
a central question of both 'Creative Society' and
'Clue To History'. Incredibly Schweitzer surveys
this question very fully before the age of 26 and
at thirty, and against opposition, devotes himself
completely to the Franciscan alternative.
What seems a remote technical question about
an obscure point leads to insights into how
history works itself out in the minds of strong
and intelligent people, insights which demand
personal responses from this onlooker.
Ivan
You cannot give what you do not have |
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Topic |
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John MacMurray's new logic.
